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The notions of static belief and of belief revision have been extensively stud-
ied in the literature. However, there is a surprising lack of uniformity in the two
approaches. In the philosophy and logic literature the notion of static belief has
been studied mainly within the context of modal logic. On the syntactic side a
belief operator B is introduced, with the intended interpretation of B as the
individual believes that . Various properties of beliefs are then expressed by
means of axioms, such as the positive introspection axiom B ! BB, which
says that if the individual believes  then she believes that she believes . On
the semantic side Kripke structures are used, consisting of a set of states (or
possible worlds) 
 together with a binary relation B on 
, with the interpre-
tation of B as at state  the individual considers state  possible. The
connection between syntax and semantics is then obtained by means of a valu-
ation V which associates with every atomic sentence p the set of states where p
is true. The pair h
;Bi is called a frame and the addition of a valuation V to a
frame yields a model. Rules are given for determining the truth of an arbitrary
formula at every state of a model; in particular, the formula B is true at state
 if and only if  is true at every  such that B, that is, if  is true at every
state that the individual considers possible at . A property of the accessibility
relation B is said to correspond to an axiom if every instance of the axiom is
true at every state of every model based on a frame that satises the property
and vice versa.
The AGM theory of belief revision, on the other hand, has followed a di¤erent
path. In this literature beliefs are modeled as sets of formulas in a given syntactic
language and the problem that has been studied is how a belief set ought to be
modied when new information, represented by a formula , becomes available.
With a few exceptions, the tools of modal logic have not been explicitly employed
in the analysis of belief revision.
In the economics and game theory literature, it is standard to represent
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beliefs by means of a probability measure over a set of states 
 and belief
revision is modeled using Bayesrule. Let P0 be the prior probability measure
representing the initial beliefs, E  
 an event representing new information
and P1 the posterior probability measure representing the revised beliefs. Bayes
rule says that, if P0(E) > 0, then, for every event A, P1(A) =
P0(A\E)
P0(E)
: Bayes
rule thus implies the following, which we call the Qualitative Bayes Rule:
if supp(P0) \ E 6= ?, then supp(P1) = supp(P0) \ E:
where supp(P ) denotes the support of the probability measure P .
In this paper we propose a unifying framework for static beliefs and belief
revision by bringing belief revision under the umbrella of modal logic and by
providing an axiomatization of the Qualitative Bayes Rule in a simple logic
based on three modal operators: B0, B1 and I, whose intended interpretation
is as follows:
B0 initially (at time 0) the individual believes that 
I (between time 0 and time 1) the individual is informed that 
B1 at time 1 (after revising his beliefs in light of the
information received) the individual believes that :
Semantically, it is clear that the Qualitative Bayes Rule embodies the conser-
vativity principle for belief revision, according to which When changing beliefs
in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old
beliefs as possible. The set of all the propositions that the individual believes
corresponds to the set of states that she considers possible (in a probabilistic
setting a state is considered possible if it is assigned positive probability). The
conservativity principle requires that, if the individual considers a state possi-
ble and her new information does not exclude this state, then she continue to
consider it possible. Furthermore, if the individual regards a particular state
as impossible, then she should continue to regard it as impossible, unless her
new information excludes all the states that she previously regarded as possible.
The axiomatization we propose gives a transparent syntactic expression to the
conservativity principle.
We begin with the semantics. A frame is a quadruple h
;B0;B1; Ii where

 is a set of states and B0, B1, and I are binary relations on 
, whose interpre-
tation is as follows:
B0 at state  the individual initially (at time 0) considers state  possible
I at state , state  is compatible with the information received
B1 at state  the individual at time 1 (in light of the information
received) considers state  possible.
Let B0(!) = f!0 2 
 : !B0!0g denote the set of states that, initially, the
individual considers possible at state !. Dene I(!) and B1(!) similarly.By
Qualitative Bayes Rule (QBR) we mean the following property:
8! 2 
; if B0(!) \ I(!) 6= ? then B1(!) = B0(!) \ I(!): (QBR)
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Thus QBR says that if at a state the information received is consistent with the
initial beliefs   in the sense that there are states that were considered possible
initially and are compatible with the information   then the states that are
considered possible according to the revised beliefs are precisely those states.
On the syntactic side we consider a modal propositional logic based on three
operators: B0, B1 and I whose intended interpretation is as explained in Section
1. The formal language is built in the usual way from a countable set S of
atomic propositions, the connectives : (for not) and _ (for or) and the
modal operators.
The connection between syntax and semantics is given by the notion of
model. Given a frame h
;B0;B1; Ii, a model is obtained by adding a valuation
V : S ! 2
 (where 2
 denotes the set of subsets of 
, usually called events)
which associates with every atomic proposition p 2 S the set of states at which
p is true. The truth of an arbitrary formula at a state is then dened inductively
as follows (! j=  denotes that formula  is true at state !; kk is the truth set
of , that is, kk = f! 2 
 : ! j= g):
if q is an atomic proposition, ! j= q if and only if ! 2 V (q),
! j= : if and only if ! 2 ,
! j=  _  if and only if either ! j=  or ! j=  (or both),
! j= B0 if and only if B0(!)  kk,
! j= B1 if and only if B1(!)  kk,
! j= I if and only if I(!) = kk :
Remark 1 Note that, while the truth conditions for B0 and B1 are the
standard ones, the truth condition of I is unusual in that the requirement is
I(!) = kk rather than merely I(!)  kk.
We say that a formula  is valid in a model if ! j=  for all ! 2 
, that
is, if  is true at every state. A formula  is valid in a frame if it is valid in
every model based on that frame. Finally, we say that a property of frames
is characterized by (or characterizes) an axiom if (1) the axiom is valid in any
frame that satises the property and, conversely, (2) whenever the axiom is valid
in a frame, then the frame satises the property.
We now introduce three axioms that, together, provide a characterization of
the Qualitative Bayes Rule.
QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE: (I ^ :B0:)! B1:
This axiom says that if the individual is informed that  (I) and he initially
considered  possible (that is, it is not the case that he believed its negation:
:B0:) then he accepts  in his revised beliefs. That is, information that is
not surprising is believed.
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The next axiom says that if the individual receives non-surprising infor-
mation (i.e. information that does not contradict his initial beliefs) then he
continues to believe everything that he believed before:
PERSISTENCE: (I ^ :B0:)! (B0 ! B1 ):
The third axiom says that beliefs should be revised in a minimal way, in the
sense that no new beliefs should be added unless they are implied by the old
beliefs and the information received:
MINIMALITY: (I ^B1 )! B0(!  ):
The Minimality axiom is not binding (that is, it is trivially satised) if the
information is surprising: suppose that at a state, say , the individual is in-
formed that  ( j= I) although he initially believed that  was not the case
( j= B0:). Then, for every formula  , the formula (!  ) is trivially true at
every state that the individual initially considered possible (B0()  k!  k)
and therefore he initially believed it ( j= B0( !  )). Thus the axiom re-
stricts the new beliefs only when the information received is not surprising, that
is, only if (I ^ :B0:) happens to be the case.
Proposition 2 The Qualitative Bayes Rule (QBR) is characterized by the con-
junction of the three axioms Qualied Acceptance, Persistence and Minimality
(that is, if a frame satises QBR then the three axioms are valid in it and -
conversely - if the three axioms are valid in a frame then the frame satises
QBR).
We now provide a sound and complete logic for belief revision. Because of
the non-standard validation rule for the information operator I, we need to add
the universal or global modality A. The interpretation of A is it is globally
true that . As before, a frame is a quadruple h
;B0;B1; Ii. To the validation
rules discussed above we add the following:
! j= A if and only if kk = 
.
We denote by L the logic determined by the following axioms and rules of
inference.
AXIOMS:
1. All propositional tautologies.
2. Axiom K for B0, B1 and A (note the absence of an analogous axiom for
I):
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B0 ^B0(!  )! B0 (K0)
B1 ^B1(!  )! B1 (K1)
A ^A(!  )! A (KA)
3. S5 axioms for A:
A!  (TA)
:A! A:A (5A)
4. Inclusion axioms for B0 and B1 (note the absence of an analogous axiom
for I):
A! B0 (Incl0)
A! B1 (Incl1)
5. Axioms to capture the non-standard semantics for I:
(I ^ I )! A($  ) (I1)
A($  )! (I$ I ) (I2)
RULES OF INFERENCE:
1. Modus Ponens: ; !  (MP)
2. Necessitation for A: A (NecA)
Note that, despite the non-standard validation rule, axiom K for I, namely
I ^ I( !  ) ! I , is trivially valid in every frame. It follows from the
completeness theorem proved below that axiom K for I is provable in L.
Recall that a logic is complete with respect to a class of frames if every
formula which is valid in every frame in that class is provable in the logic (that
is, it is a theorem). The logic is sound with respect to a class of frames if every
theorem of the logic is valid in every frame in that class.
Proposition 3 Logic L is sound and complete with respect to the class of all
frames h
;B0;B1; Ii.
We are interested in extensions of L obtained by adding various axioms. Let
R (Rstands for Revision) be the logic obtained by adding to L the axioms
discussed in the previous section:
R = L + Qualied Acceptance + Persistence + Minimality.
Proposition 4 Logic R is sound and complete with respect to the class of
frames h
;B0;B1; Ii that satisfy the Qualitative Bayes Rule.
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So far we have not postulated any properties of beliefs, in particular, in the
interest of generality, we have not required beliefs to satisfy the KD45 logic. In
order to further explore the implications of the Qualitative Bayes Rule, we shall
now consider additional axioms:
Consistency of initial beliefs B0! :B0: (D0)
Positive Introspection of initial beliefs B0! B0B0 (40)
Self Trust B0(B0! ) (ST)
Information Trust B0(I! ) (IT).
Self Trust says that the individual at time 0 believes that his beliefs are correct
(he believes that if he believes  then  is true), while Information Trust says
that the individual at time 0 believes that any information he will receive will
be correct (he believes that if he is informed that  then  is true).
Remark 5 Since the additional axioms listed above are canonical, it follows
from Proposition 4 that if  is a set of axioms from the above list, then the logic
R+ obtained by adding to R the axioms in  is sound and complete with respect
to the class of frames that satisfy the Qualitative Bayes Rule and the properties
corresponding to the axioms in . For example, the logic R + fD0; 40; STg is
sound and complete with respect to the class of frames that satisfy the Qualitative
Bayes Rule as well as seriality, transitivity and secondary reexivity of B0.
It can be shown that No Change (B0 ^ I! (B1 $ B0 )) is a theorem
of R+D0. We now discuss some further theorems of extensions of R. Consider
the following axiom:
B0! B0B1
which says that if the individual initially believes that  then she initially be-
lieves that she will continue to believe  later.
Proposition 6 B0! B0B1 is a theorem of R+ 40 + ST + IT .
Consider now the following axiom which is the converse of the previous one:
B0B1! B0:
This axiom says that if the individual initially believes that later on she will
believe  then she must believe  initially.
Proposition 7 B0B1! B0 is a theorem of R+ ST + IT .
Putting together Propositions 6 and 7 we obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 8 B0$ B0B1 is a theorem of R+ 40 + ST + IT .
We now extend the framework to deal with iterated revision. We model,
at every state, only the information that is actually received by the individual
and do not model how the individual would have modied his beliefs if he had
received a di¤erent piece of information. Thus we cannot compare the revised
beliefs the individual holds after receiving information  with the beliefs he
would have had if he had been informed of both  and  . On the other hand,
it is possible in our framework to model the e¤ect of receiving rst information
 and then information  . Indeed, any sequence of pieces of information can be
easily modeled. In order to do this, we need to add a time index to the belief
and information operators. Thus, for t 2 N (where N denotes the set of natural
numbers), we have a belief operator Bt representing the individuals beliefs at
time t. In order to avoid confusion, we attach a double index (t; t+1) to the an
information operator, so that It;t+1 represents the information received by the
individual between time t and time t+1: Thus the intended interpretation is as
follows:
Bt at time t the individual believes that 
It;t+1 between time t and time t+ 1 the individual is informed that 
Bt+1 at time t+ 1 (in light of the information received between t and
t+ 1) the individual believes that :
Let Bt and It;t+1 be the associated binary relations. The iterated version
of the qualitative Bayes rule then is the following simple extension of QBR:
8! 2 
;8t 2 N;
if Bt(!) \ It;t+1(!) 6= ? then Bt+1(!) = Bt(!) \ It;t+1(!): (IQBR)
The iterated Bayes rule plays an important role in game theory, since it is
the main building block of two widely used solution concepts for dynamic (or
extensive) games, namely Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilib-
rium. The idea behind these solution concepts is that, during the play of the
game, a player should revise his beliefs by using Bayesrule as long as possible.
Thus if an information set has been reached that had positive prior probability,
then beliefs at that information set are obtained by using Bayesrule (with the
information being represented by the set of nodes in the information set under
consideration). If an information set is reached that had zero prior probability,
then new beliefs are formed more or less arbitrarily, but from that point onwards
these new beliefs must be used in conjunction with Bayesrule, unless further
information is received that is inconsistent with those revised beliefs. This is
precisely what IQBR requires.
Within this more general framework, a simple adaptation of Propositions 2
and 4 yields the following result:
Proposition 9 (1) The Iterated Qualitative Bayes Rule (IQBR) is character-
ized by the conjunction of the following three axioms:
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Iterated Qualied Acceptance: (:Bt: ^ It;t+1)! Bt+1
Iterated Persistence: (:Bt: ^ It;t+1)! (Bt ! Bt+1 )
Iterated Minimality (It;t+1 ^Bt+1 )! Bt(!  ):
(2) The logic obtained by adding the above three axioms to the straightforward
adaptation of logic L to a multi-period framework is sound and complete with
respect to the class of frames that satisfy the Iterated Qualitative Bayes Rule.
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